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24 February 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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
## DAILY BRIEF

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\*USSR: [REDACTED] An unusual number of Soviet diplomats are currently in Moscow, and Ambassador Thompson believes that this may mean some major turn in Soviet foreign policy is under consideration. The ambassadors to London, Paris, Washington, and Rome are still in Moscow, although some of them were scheduled to return to their posts some time ago. Thompson also reports that a number of Soviet ambassadors to the satellite countries may have recently been in Moscow. The Soviet ambassador to Laos, Abramov, also departed abruptly for Moscow last week, and Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin has not returned to the Geneva conference, although he was expected back on 19 February. Ambassador Thompson says that the ambassadors may merely be awaiting the return of Khrushchev for a routine briefing, but he speculates that their presence is more likely related to a foreign policy question. The presence of ambassadors to the main Western countries suggests that they may be involved in considerations of major East-West questions, such as the forthcoming Geneva disarmament conference and the German question; Abramov's sudden recall may mean that questions relating to Southeast Asia, possibly including Sino-Soviet relations, are also under review. [REDACTED] (SEMINATION): [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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\*Congo: Tshombé's 23 February announcement that he is prepared to go to Leopoldville for talks with Adoula suggests that he regards recent Katangan military successes in northern Katanga as having strengthened his hand for negotiations with the central government. Tshombé earlier had demanded that any talks be held at Kamina base in Katanga; he continues



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to insist on ironclad UN guarantees for his security in connection with any trip to Leopoldville.

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21 February UN air reconnaissance indicated that Kongolo, in northern Katanga, had been occupied by an estimated 200 Katangan troops. The US Embassy reports that, as of 23 February, central government control of nearby Kabalo was "tenuous." Over the objections of UN military authorities, who urged that the central government send troops to Kabalo, Mobutu planned as of 23 February to airlift 1,500 troops from Kasai Province to Albertville. The embassy observed that Mobutu has available only four transport aircraft, and that he may petition the UN for assistance. (Map)

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USSR-China: Moscow may be preparing a new attack on the Albanian leaders and their Chinese Communist defenders. Pravda on 21 February devoted two full pages to articles and statements made several months earlier by leaders of other Communist parties supporting the new Soviet party program and the course established at the 22nd party congress, but pointedly observed that the Chinese only "published" the congress documents--i. e., without comment. Pravda is sensitive to Western claims that international Communist ranks are split and denies that there is a crisis in the Communist movement. The lead editorial, however, stated that dogmatism--which the Russians privately say dominates Mao Tse-tung's thinking--under certain conditions can become the "main danger" to various parties. While attacking the Albanian leaders for their "splitting activities," Khrushchev may use the danger of dogmatism as a pretext for criticizing Peiping more openly, possibly in his report to the central committee plenum to open on 5 March.

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Syria-Israel: Prime Minister Dawalibi, in amplifying on Syria's 21 February note to the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and Rumania--members of the UN Security Council with representatives in Damascus--on the subject of Israel's plans for diverting water from the Jordan River basin, emphasized to the American ambassador that, if Israel cannot be restrained peacefully, Syria will have to resort to force, as it did when the controversy first arose in 1953. Dawalibi said that while he was not talking in terms of days, the time at his disposal may be short. His sense of urgency has been influenced by Egyptian criticism of Syria's record on the question. It may also reflect efforts by the Damascus government to exploit an issue which tends to unify divergent Syrian political elements and which might discourage present maneuvering for positions of power within the Syrian Army.

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India-Pakistan:

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Pakistani officials, now engaged in an intensive review of tactics to be followed in pressing Pakistan's case in the UN next month, see little value in a Nehru-Ayub meeting in the absence of some indication from New Delhi of willingness to compromise. They probably will continue to view international pressure on

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[ ] India as the only means likely to lead Nehru to negotiate a compromise solution. Moreover, as internal unrest in Pakistan is likely to grow following promulgation of the new constitution on 1 March, Ayub probably will be more inclined to take a hard line on Kashmir and use the issue to divert attention from domestic problems. [ ]

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[ ] \*Laos: [ ] Souvanna is continuing his exploratory talks in Vientiane in an effort to achieve a coalition cabinet. In consultation with Western ambassadors, Souvanna fashioned a new cabinet list on 23 February providing for a more equitable distribution of the "neutralist" center between Vientiane and Xieng Khouang than did his original slate, which was heavily weighted in favor of the latter. The tentative nature of this slate is pointed up by the fact that Souvanna has yet to clear it with Phoumi and Souphannouvong. [ ]

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